A Pre-History of the Americans with Disabilities Act and Some Initial Thoughts as to Its Constitutional Implications by Rains, Robert E.
Penn State Dickinson Law 
Dickinson Law IDEAS 
Faculty Scholarly Works Faculty Scholarship 
1992 
A Pre-History of the Americans with Disabilities Act and Some 
Initial Thoughts as to Its Constitutional Implications 
Robert E. Rains 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ideas.dickinsonlaw.psu.edu/fac-works 
Recommended Citation 
Robert E. Rains, A Pre-History of the Americans with Disabilities Act and Some Initial Thoughts as to Its 
Constitutional Implications, 11 St. Louis U. Pub. L. Rev. 185 (1992). 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Dickinson Law IDEAS. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarly Works by an authorized administrator of Dickinson Law IDEAS. For 
more information, please contact lja10@psu.edu. 
A PRE-HISTORY OF THE AMERICANS WITH
DISABILITIES ACT AND SOME INITIAL THOUGHTS
AS TO ITS CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS
ROBERT E. RAINS*
I. INTRODUCTION
On July 26, 1990, President Bush signed into law the Americans
With Disabilities Act of 1990 (the A.D.A.). 1 This landmark legislation
has been hailed as the "Emancipation Proclamation for those with dis-
abilities."' Its broad provisions address employment, public services,
public transportation, public accommodations, and telecommunications
in elaborate and technical detail, with over fifty pages in the Statutes
at Large, and a multitude of effective dates.' Its strong provisions
prohibiting employment discrimination against persons with disabilities
will apply to employers with twenty-five or more employees as of July
1992, and to those with fifteen or more employees as of July 1994.4
There are provisions for enforcement by the Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Commission, by the U.S. Attorney General and by persons alleg-
ing discrimination.' Invoking its constitutional powers, 6 Congress has
declared that states are not immune under the eleventh amendment in
any action for violation of the A.D.A.7 Congress has further provided
* Prof. of Law and Director, Disability Law Clinic, The Dickinson School of Law.
This Article is an expansion of remarks delivered at the Pennsylvania Bar Association
Annual Meeting, "The Bill of Rights for Everyone," in Philadelphia, May 1991.
1. Pub. L. No.101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (1990), 42 U.S.C.A. § 12101-12213 (West
1991).
2. Harkin, Our Newest Civil Rights Law, TRIAL 56 (Dec. 1990); Ludwig, and
Turner, New Promises to Keep, THE PA. LAW. 15-16 (Jan. 1991). In somewhat more
restrained language, the A.D.A. has also been called "a new bill of rights for the dis-
abled." Brandfield, Undue Hardship: Title I of the Americans With Disabilities Act,
59 FORDHAM L. REV. 116-7 (1990).
3. For a concise explanation of the effective dates see Parry, The Americans
With Disabilities Act, Effective Dates In Each Title, 15 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DIsA-
BILITY L. REP. 13 (Jan.-Feb. 1991).
4. Americans with Disabilities Act § 101(5)(A), 42 U.S.C.A. § 12111(5)(A)
(West 1991).
5. Id. at § 107(a), 42 U.S.C.A. § 12117(a).
6. Id. at § 2(b)(4), 42 U.S.C.A. § 12101(b)(4).
7. Id. at § 502, 42 U.S.C.A. § 12202.
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for the award of attorneys' fees to the prevailing party8 even if the
defendant is the United States.9
One cannot fully appreciate the remarkable achievement the
A.D.A. constitutes without understanding the history of prior attempts
(or the lack thereof) to bring individuals with disabilities under the
protection of federal antidiscrimination laws. This Article will take a
brief look at the politics of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,10 which failed
to address handicap discrimination. It will then explore the passage of
the Rehabilitation Act of 197311 and its subsequent mixed (at best)
reception in the Supreme Court. Finally it will raise a question and
suggest an analysis as to the constitutional implications of the A.D.A.
II. A GLIMPSE AT THE PoLITICs OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF
1964
In 1964, America was mourning the assassination of its young
President, and a new President from the Deep South became commit-
ted to the enactment of a new Civil Rights Act addressing the griev-
ances of the black minority. The civil rights movement had been active
for some period of time. There had been freedom rides,1 2 riots and the
intervention of federal troops at "Ole Miss,"13 murders of both black
and white civil rights activists,1 4 the historic March on Washington,15
the bombing of Birmingham's Sixteenth St. Baptist Church18 and free-
dom riders martyred.17 The basics of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, now
taken for granted in most quarters, were a hotly debated political issue.
8. Id. at § 505, 42 U.S.C.A. § 12205.
9. Id.
10. Pub. L. No.88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964).
11. Pub. L. No.93-112, 87 Stat. 355 (1973).
12. "The summer of freedom rides" occurred in 1961. T. BRANCH, PARTING THE
WATERS - AMERICA IN THE KING YEARS 451-491 (1988).
13. Two deaths resulted from the rioting surrounding the efforts of James Mere-
dith to register at the University of Mississippi in 1962. See M. VIORST, FIRE IN THE
STREETS 215 (1979).
14. "On April 23, William L. Moore, a white postman from Baltimore, was shot
dead on an Alabama highway while carrying a sign saying 'Equal Rights for All.' On
June 12, Medgar Evers, field secretary of the Mississippi NAACP, was murdered by a
sniper's bullet outside his home in Jackson." Id. at 222.
15. The March on Washington - at which Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. delivered
his famous "I Have a Dream" speech - occurred on August 28, 1963. L. FISHEL AND B.
QUARLES, THE NEGRO AMERICAN: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 531-534 (1967).
16. Four young black girls were killed in this heinous crime less than three weeks
after the March on Washington. See T. BRANCH, supra note 12, at 888-92.
17. Freedom riders Schwerner, Chaney and Goodman disappeared on June 21,
1964, shortly before passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. Their bodies were not dis-
covered until August 4. See M. VIORST, supra note 13, at 258-9. Obviously the events
described in this sentence of text are only meant to be reminders of a traumatic time in
America's history; this is not intended to be even a brief overview of the civil rights
movement.
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Moreover, the South had voted Democratic consistently since Recon-
struction,' 8 and the former President had only been elected in 1960 by
the slimmest of majorities, dependent in the Electoral College on his
victory in the South."" Although the era of "Massive Resistance" was
coming to an end,20 there was very strong and entrenched resistance to
enactment of the 1964 Civil Rights Bill, and its passage was far from
assured. Indeed in the upcoming Presidential campaign in 1964, the
vote against that bill by the nominee of one of the two major parties
became a significant electoral issue.2'
Against this background, one of the opponents of the enactment of
the 1964 Civil Rights Bill, the extremely powerful chairman of the
House Rules Committee, Howard "Judge" Smith, came up with what
appeared to be a brilliant idea. He proposed an amendment to Title
VII of the Civil Rights Bill, the employment provisions, which would
be so divisive that if it were passed, it could scuttle the entire Civil
Rights Bill. Therefore, to the horror of northern liberals, Judge Smith
proposed the addition of the word "sex" into Title VII's list of imper-
missible bases for employment decisions. Immediately, a group of
northern liberals, sympathetic to the Civil Rights Bill and fearful that
this amendment would make it too controversial, took the floor of the
House to speak against it. "With a coalition of southerners and women
supporting it and the rest of the House hopelessly divided on the appar-
ent choice between equal rights for blacks and equal rights for women,
the Smith Amendment passed, 168-133.1122
18. N. PEIRCE, THE PEOPLE'S PRESIDENT, 93, 97, 176, 189, 216-17, 260, 270
(1968).
19. Id. at 20. Despite a very close victory in the popular vote, Kennedy won the
Electoral College by a margin of 303 to 219, carrying Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia,
Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Texas. THE WORLD AL-
MANAC AND BOOK OF FACTS 1990, 309-333 (1990).
20. "Massive Resistance", a term championed by Virginia Senator Harry Byrd,
was the political rallying cry for those who vowed to fight desegregation by such means
as closing any white school that allowed black children to enroll. See J. PELTASON,
FIFTY-EIGHT LONELY MEN 208-18 (1961); R. WOLTERS, THE BURDEN OF BROWN -
THIRTY YEARS OF SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 65-127 (1984).
21. Although Pres. Johnson and Sen. Goldwater agreed not to make the latter's
vote against the bill a campaign issue, Sen. Goldwater was publicly criticized as a
racist, and he broke the agreement by publicly attacking the bill in the last Week of the
presidential campaign. B. GOLDWATER, GOLDWATER 193 (1988), T.H. WHITE, THE
MAKING OF THE PRESIDENT 1964, 205, 319, 357 (1965). The importance of this issue is
best seen in the remarkable reversal of regional voting patterns in 1964, with the
Republicans carrying five states of the Deep South - Mississippi, Alabama, Louisiana,
South Carolina and Georgia. THE MAKING OF A PRESIDENT 1964, at 400. In addition,
Goldwater would have carried another four Southern states - Virginia, North Carolina,
Tennessee, and Arkansas - but "for the phenomenal increase and spectacular shape of
Negro voting." Id. at 401.
22. W. ESKRIDGE, JR. AND P. FRICKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION:
STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 12-17 (1988). This text provides a
1992]
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Considering that northern liberals seeking to extend civil rights to
blacks already opposed dilution and further politicization of their pro-
posed legislation by the addition of employment protections for women,
it is hardly surprising that there was simply no constituency in the
Congress for incorporating any provisions into the 1964 Civil Rights
Bill to protect individuals with handicaps. As we know, the Civil Rights
Bill became law, but sadly contained no protections for individuals with
disabilities.
Of course there was a great debate in Congress over its authority
to enact the 1964 Civil Rights Act. Some legislators looked to the com-
merce, clause, some to the enforcement power found in section 5 of the
fourteenth amendment. Others believed that they could rely upon ei-
ther or both.23 After the 1964 Civil Rights Act was enacted, it was
promptly challenged in cases that quickly came before the United
States Supreme Court. In Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States,24
the Court upheld the public accommodations provisions in Title II on
the basis of the commerce clause, and therefore did not reach the four-
teenth amendment issue. In Katzenbach v. McClung,25 the Court up-
held application of the Title II provisions to a restaurant that was not
frequented by interstate travelers where that restaurant received a sub-
stantial portion of its food through interstate commerce. Again the
Court relied on the commerce clause and did not reach the fourteenth
amendment issue.
III. THE REHABILITATION ACT OF 1973
In the early 1970s, Congress attempted, somewhat belatedly, to
enact protections into federal law that would address handicap discrim-
ination, albeit not in as broad a fashion as the 1964 Civil Rights Act
addressed other forms of discrimination. This legislation was to have
almost as difficult a process of enactment as the Civil Rights Act had.
In 1972 Congress passed H.R. 8395, the "Rehabilitation Act of 1972."
fuller description of the legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, at 1-28. The
author is indebted to this source for the history of Rep. Smith's ill-fated effort to tor-
pedo the Civil Rights Bill. Lest anyone doubt Rep. Smith's true position on this legisla-
tion, one need only note his remarks on the date of its final enactment, July 2, 1964,
when he referred to it as a "monstrous invasion of the civil and constitutional rights of
all the 180 million people of this country. . ." and a "monstrous implement of oppres-
sion. . . ." He warned that "[h]ordes of beatniks, misfits, and agitators from the
North, with the admitted aid of the Communists, are streaming into the Southland on
mischief bent, backed and defended by other hordes of Federal marshals, Federal
agents and Federal power." Quoted in STATUTORY HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES:
CIvIL RIGHTS, PART II, 1420-21 (SCHWARTZ, 1970).
23. See STATUTORY HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 22, at 1089-
1452, esp. 1186, 1198-1203; 1964 U.S. CODE CONG. AND ADMIN. NEWS. 2366-8.
24. 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
25. 379 U.S. 294 (1964), colloquially known as the "Ollie's Barbecue" case.
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President Nixon pocket-vetoed that bill in October 1972, thereby leav-
ing Congress with no opportunity to override the veto.26
Undaunted by rejection of the 1972 bill, Congress passed a new
version of the Rehabilitation Act, S.7, in 1973. President Nixon vetoed
this version of the Rehabilitation Act,2' and the Senate failed to over-
ride that veto.28
Finally, Congress passed H.R. 8070, yet another version of the Re-
habilitation Act, which was acceptable to President Nixon who signed
it into law in September 1973.29 Hence, almost a full decade after pas-
sage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, there was finally some legislation at
the federal level that extended some protection against discrimination
to individuals with disabilities in some situations.
The Rehabilitation Act of 1973 clearly constituted an enormous
step forward, at the federal level, for individuals with disabilities.
Moreover, it acted as an impetus for many states to add provisions to
their state antidiscrimination laws to provide protections for individuals
with handicaps.30 Nevertheless, there were and are many deficiencies in
the Rehabilitation Act. These may be grouped into several categories.
The first deficiency in the Rehabilitation Act is its coverage.
Whereas the 1964 Civil Rights Act, (as amended in 1972) extended its
protections against discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion,
sex, and national origin, alleged to be committed by employers with
fifteen or more employees,$1 the reach of the Rehabilitation Act
26. 28 CONG. Q. ALMANAC, 80-A - 81-A (1972).
27. SENATE DOCUMENTS, Vol. 1-1, No. 93-10 (1973).
28. 29 CONG. Q. ALMANAC, 560 (1973).
29. Id. at 557. The Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355
(1973). The antidiscrimination provisions are contained in Title V §§ 501, 503 and
504, 29 U.S.C. §§ 791, 793 and 794 (1982).
30. By 1986 forty-three states and the District of Columbia had statutes to pro-
tect handicapped people from private employment discrimination. Flacus, Discrimina-
tion Legislation for the Handicapped: Much Ferment and the Erosion of Coverage, 55
CIN. L. REv. 109, n.189 (1986).
31. Subchapter VI - Equal Employment Opportunities, Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1982) provides:
§ 2000e. Definitions
For the purposes of this subchapter-.
(b) The term "employer" means a person engaged in an industry affecting
commerce who has fifteen or more employees for each working day in each
of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year,
and any agent of such a person, but such term does not include (1) the
United States, a corporation wholly owned by the Government of the United
States, an Indian tribe, or any department or agency of the District of Co-
lumbia subject by statute to procedures of the competitive service (as de-
fined in section 2102 of Title 5), or (2) a bona fide private membership club
(other than a labor organization) which is exempt from taxation under sec-
tion 501(c) of Title 26, except that during the first year after March 24,
1972, persons having fewer than twenty-five employees (and their agents)
shall not be considered employers.
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Amendments of 1973 is far more limited. The Rehabilitation Act only
prohibits handicap discrimination by federal executive agencies, federal
grantees and federal contractors.3 2 Therefore, there is a very large uni-
verse of employers with fifteen or more employees who are prohibited
from discriminating on the basis of race, color, religion, sex or national
origin, but who can discriminate against handicapped individuals with
impunity, having committed no violation of federal law.
The second major deficiency of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 was
in its enforcement provisions, or lack thereof. As originally enacted,
section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, dealing with discrimination by
federal grantees, had no mechanisms for enforcement. Indeed, there
were no regulations promulgated by the federal government until the
government was sued. In Cherry v. Mathews, 33 the Secretary of
Health, Education and Welfare (HEW) was ordered by the federal dis-
trict court to promulgate such regulations. The Secretary filed an ap-
peal.34 It was not until May 1977, that HEW promulgated the first set
of implementing regulations, and this occurred only after there was a
wheelchair sit-in in the outer office of Secretary Califano.35
A third problem with the Rehabilitation Act was with funding.
When HEW finally promulgated the first set of regulations three and a
half years after enactment of the Rehabilitation Act, it estimated that
the regulations would cost approximately $3.2 billion per year.36 Con-
gress appropriated nothing. This lack of funding created real hardships
for federal grantees who would be caught in the "Catch 22" of either
not complying with the regulations or using funds that had been ob-
tained for other purposes in order to comply. This dilemma was best
articulated by Federal District Judge Robert W. Hemphill. In Barnes
The provision extending coverage to employers with fifteen to twenty-four employees
was added by the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. 92-261, 86
Stat. 103.
32. Section 501 requires affirmative action in employment by federal executive
agencies. 29 U.S.C. § 791 (1982). Section 503 likewise requires affirmative action in
employment by federal contractors with contracts over $2,500. 29 U.S.C. § 793 (1982).
Section 504 requires nondiscrimination by federal executive agencies and federal grant-
ees. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982).
33. 419 F. Supp. 922 (D.D.C. 1976).
34. The Secretary filed an appeal on January 19, 1977. After the Secretary
promulgated the regulation, the Court of Appeals dismissed the action as moot. Cherry
v. Mathews, D.D.C. No. 76-0255, docket entries on file at office of St. Louis Univ.
Public Law Review.
35. 42 Fed. Reg., 22676 et seq. (May 4, 1977), applicable to grantees receiving
funds from the Department of Health, Education and Welfare. For a description of the
demonstrations, see Fraker and McGee, Hire the Handicapped NEwswEEK, 39 May 9,
1977. See also 33 CONG. Q. ALMANAC, 483-4 (1977).
36. O'Neill, Discrimination Against Handicapped Persons, The Costs, Benefits
and Economic Impact of Implementing Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973
Covering Recipients of HEW Financial Assistance, 64-5 (May 4, 1977). To obtain a
copy of this work, see 42 Fed. Reg. 22,677 (May 4, 1977).
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v. Converse College,7 a hearing-impaired college student sought an in-
terpreter while she attended a college that received federal funds.
Judge Hemphill granted her request for a preliminary injunction, or-
dering the college to provide the interpreter. Doing so, he delivered
some telling remarks. In his opinion he wrote:
Converse College has been in the vanguard of educational institu-
tions in the region which have developed programs and facilities for
the handicapped. It is ironic that its students and benefactors may
now be forced by the federal government to shoulder a substantial
financial burden to provide special services for any handicapped per-
son who should choose to go to Converse College. This is not to say
that this court is not entirely sympathetic with the spirit of federal
legislation which encourages the expansion of opportunities for the
handicapped. This is merely to say that if the federal government, in
all its wisdom, decides that money should be spent to provide oppor-
tunities for a particular group of people, that government should be
willing to spend its own money (i.e. our taxes) for such purposes and
not require that private educational institutions use their limited
funds for such purposes.8"
A related enforcement problem was, for many years, the lack of
any clear articulation by the United States Supreme Court of whether
a private right of action existed under the Act. The Supreme Court
perhaps set a record for the number of times that it side-stepped this
issue. In New York City Transit Authority v. Beazer,39 the Court was
faced with a challenge to the Transit Authority's denial of employment
to persons receiving methadone maintenance treatment. The job appli-
cants raised to the Supreme Court a 1978 amendment to the Rehabili-
tation Act which rather clearly included discrimination on the basis of
drug and alcohol use as a potential basis for relief under the Act.' The
Court refused to address the issue. It stated:
Even if respondents correctly interpret the amendment, and even if
they have a right to enforce that interpretation, the case is not moot
since their claims arose even before the Act itself was passed, and
they have been awarded monetary relief. Moreover, the language of
37. 436 F. Supp. 635 (D.S.C. 1977).
38. Id. at 639.
39. New York City Transit Authority v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 580-581 (1979).
40. The Rehabilitation, Comprehensive Services, and Developmental Disabilities
Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-602, 92 Stat. 2955 (1978), amended the defini-
tion section in Title V of the Rehabilitation Act, by adding the following, curiously
negatively phrased language:
For purposes of sections 503 and 504 as such sections relate to employment,
such term does not include any individual who is an alcoholic or drug abuser
whose current use of alcohol or drugs prevents such individual from per-
forming the duties of the job in question or whose employment, by reason of
such current alcohol or drug abuse, would constitute a direct threat to prop-
erty or the safety of others.
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the statute, even after its amendment, is not free from ambiguity,
and no administrative or judicial opinions specifically considering the
impact of the statute on methadone users have been called to our
attention. Of greater importance it is perfectly clear that however we
might construe the Rehabilitation Act, the concerns that prompted
our grant of certiorari would still merit our attention. We therefore
decline to give the statute its first judicial construction at this stage
of the litigation.
41
In a footnote, the majority pointed out that the Court had granted cer-
tiorari in the pending case of Southeastern Community College v. Da-
vis42 in which it would address whether there exists a private right of
action to enforce Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.'
Although the Court did indeed decide Southeastern Community
College v. Davis in 1979, 44 it managed to resolve the case on the merits
without ever addressing the issue of whether the plaintiff, Ms. Davis,
was authorized by the Rehabilitation Act to bring her private action in
federal court. The Court noted:
In addition to challenging the construction of §504 by the Court of
Appeals, Southeastern also contends that respondent cannot seek ju-
dicial relief for violations of that statute in view of the absence of
any express private right of action. Respondent asserts that whether
or not §504 provides a private action, she may maintain her suit
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In light of our disposition of this case on
the merits, it is unnecessary to address these issues and we express
no views on them.45
In short, the Court managed to decide the merits of the case without
deciding whether it had jurisdiction to hear the case, and did this de-
spite its promise in Beazer that it would decide this issue in the Davis
case.
Two years later, the Court had yet another opportunity to address
the remedies available to a handicapped person alleging discrimination
by a federal grantee. Again it failed to do so. In Camenisch v. Univer-
sity of Texas,'6 the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the granting
of a preliminary injunction by a district court directing the university,
pursuant to section 504, to provide a sign language interpreter to a deaf
graduate student. The circuit court specifically found that the Rehabili-
tation Act confers a private right of action to enforce section 504
through injunctive relief.' 7 The University petitioned for a writ of cer-
41. Beazer, 440 U.S. at 580-1 (emphasis added).
42. 439 U.S. 1065 (1979).
43. Beazer, 440 U.S. at 580, n.17.
44. 442 U.S. 397 (1979).
45. Id. at 404-5 n.5 (citations omitted).
46. 616 F.2d 127 (5th Cir. 1980).
47. Id. at 130-31.
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tiorari on the issue of the existence of a private right of action, as well
as on the merits of the case. 8 The Supreme Court granted review of
the questions presented.4 9 After oral argument, the Court found that
one issue that had been raised was moot, and that the remaining sub-
stantive issue had to be remanded for a trial on the merits. Despite the
fact that such a trial on the merits would have been wholly unnecessary
if Mr. Camenisch had had no private right of action, the Court again
declined to determine that issue.' 0
It was not until 1984, some eleven years after the enactment of
section 504, that the Supreme Court finally decided that there is a pri-
vate right of action to enforce it, and even then the Court did so in a
rather off-handed fashion. In Consolidated Rail Corporation v. Dar-
rone,51 the Court noted that Conrail had argued below and in its open-
ing brief that section 504 does not create a private right of action for
employment discrimination. Conrail abandoned this position in its reply
brief, and therefore the Court found: "it is unnecessary to address the
issue here beyond noting that the courts below relied on Cannon v. Uni-
versity of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979), in holding that such a private
right exists under § 504. ''52 The Court went on to hold that a handi-
capped person may recover back pay for intentional employment dis-
crimination in an action to enforce section 504 even if the employer
"receives no federal aid the primary purpose of which is to promote
employment." 53 The necessary implication of this holding, along with
the footnote already mentioned, is that the Court finally found a pri-
vate right of action to enforce section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act in
federal court."
Handicapped persons were not as fortunate in obtaining judicial
remedies under section 503 of the Rehabilitation Act - requiring af-
firmative action by federal contractors - as they ultimately were
under section 504. Section 503 of the Rehabilitation Act provides for
48. 49 U.S.L.W. 3295 (Oct. 21, 1980).
49.' 449 U.S. 950 (1980).
50. University of Texas v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390 (1981).
51. 465 U.S. 624 (1984).
52. Id. at 630, n.7.
53. Id. at 637.
54. It should be noted that many lower courts had already inferred such a pri-
vate right of action to enforce section 504, although they did not do so with unanimity.
See Miener v. State of Missouri, 673 F.2d 969 (8th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S.
909 (1982), on remand, 580 F.Supp. 562 (E.D. Mo. 1984); Doe v. New York Univer-
sity, 666 F.2d 761 (2d Cir. 1981); NAACP v. Wilmington Medical Center, 599 F.2d
1247 (3rd Cir. 1979); but see Longoria v. Harris, 554 F.Supp. 102 (S.D. Tex. 1982) -
no private right of action for damages. It was not until 1978 that Congress amended
the Rehabilitation Act to add section 505 providing for attorneys' fees for prevailing
parties enforcing their rights under section 504. The Rehabilitation Comprehensive
Service, and Developmental Disabilities Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-602, 92 Stat,
2955 (1978), adding section 505, 29 U.S.C. § 794a (1982).
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filing administrative complaints with the United States Department of
Labor, Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs (OFCCP). 5.
Over the years the OFCCP has received, at best, mixed reviews from
advocates for the handicapped as to the zeal with which it has investi-
gated and attempted to rectify such discrimination complaints 8  Sadly,
in an unbroken series of decisions, each circuit court of appeals which
addressed the subject found that handicapped persons have no private
right of action to assert in federal court a violation of their rights under
section 503 of the Rehabilitation Act. 57 Utilizing the four-part test
enunciated by the Supreme Court in Cort v. Ash, 8 these courts found
that section 503 does not create such a private right of action. Bi-
zarrely, these courts did not even find that handicapped persons meet
the first part of the "Cort test," that they be one of the class for whose
special benefit the statute was enacted.59 By 1982, this finding of no
judicially enforceable rights under section 503 was so clear to the fed-
eral courts that the Third Circuit Court of Appeals took only two brief
paragraphs to join the other circuits, doing so in a per curiam
opinion.60
55. 29 U.S.C. § 793(b);see also 41 C.F.R. part 60-741.
56. In 1987, a report of the staff of the House Education and Labor Committee
asserted that the OFCCP was "completely ineffective" and enforcing "underhanded
policies" with regard to section 503. 10 HANDICAPPED AM. REP., 107 (June 4, 1987).
See also Healy v. Bergmann, 609 F. Supp. 1448, 1455-6 (D. Mass. 1985).
57. See, e.g., D'Amato v. Wisconsin Gas Co., 760 F.2d 1474 (7th Cir. 1985);
Hodges v. Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Ry. Co., 728 F.2d 414 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 822 (1984); Painter v. Home Bros., Inc., 710 F.2d 143 (4th Cir.
1983); Davis v. Ohio Barge Line, Inc., 697 F.2d 549 (3d Cir. 1983); Beam v. Sun
Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Co., 679 F.2d 1077 (3d Cir. 1982); Fisher v. Tucson, 663
F.2d 861 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 881 (1982); Davis v. United Airlines,
Inc., 662 F.2d 120 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 965 (1982); Simon v. St.
Louis County, 656 F.2d 316 (8th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 976 (1982); Brown
v. Sibley, 650 F.2d 760 (5th Cir. 1981); Simpson v. Reynolds Metals Co., 629 F.2d
1226 (7th Cir. 1980); Rogers v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 611 F.2d 1074 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 889 (1980); Hoopes v. Equifax, Inc., 611 F.2d 134 (6th Cir. 1979); Sanders
v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, 652 F. Supp. 765 (D.D.C. 1986),
aff'd, 819 F.2d 1151 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Patton v. Thompson, 37 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 1024 (M.D. Ala. 1983), aff'd, 742 F.2d 1465 (11th Cir. 1984), cert. denied,
471 U.S. 1005 (1985); Ernst v. Indiana Bell Telephone Co., 30 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 1248 (S.D. Ind. 1982), affid, 717 F.2d 1036 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464
U.S. 1041 (1984).
58. 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975) (First, is the plaintiff "one of the class for whose
especial benefit the statute was enacted." Second, is there any indication of either im-
plicit or explicit legislative intent to create or deny a remedy? Third, "is it consistent
with the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme to imply such a remedy for the
plaintiff?" Fourth, "is the cause of action one traditionally relegated to state law, in an
area basically the concern of the States so that it would be inappropriate to infer a
cause of action based solely on federal law?").
59. See, e.g., Rogers v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 611 F.2d 1074, 1079-80 (5th Cir. 1980).
60. Beam v. Sun Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 679 F.2d 1077 (3d Cir. 1982).
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Over the years, the Supreme Court issued a number of limiting
decisions creating problems with enforcement and coverage of the Re-
habilitation Act.61 Although the Court had finally recognized that pri-
vate parties may bring actions in federal court to enforce their rights
under section 504, the very next year the Court created an enormous
exception. In Atascadero v. Scanlon, 2 the Court held that a plaintiff
may not bring an action under section 504 where the defendant is a
state or a state agency. The Court found that such actions are pro-
scribed by the eleventh amendment, and barred compensatory, injunc-
tive and declaratory relief.6" Fortunately, Congress effectively over-
turned this result the next year by enacting the Civil Rights Remedies
Equalization Act.6"
In Community Television of Southern California v. Gottfried, 5
the Court found that a licensing agency has no duty to consider a licen-
see's alleged violation of section 504. The Court addressed a challenge
by a group of deaf and hearing- impaired persons to the license renew-
als by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) of one public
television station and seven commercial stations. Plaintiffs asserted that
the stations failed to serve the public interest and violated section 504
by failing to ascertain and meet their special needs. The court of ap-
peals distinguished between commercial and public stations and ruled
that commercial stations are not bound by section 504 because they do
not receive federal funds, while public stations that receive federal
funds are bound by section 504. Thus "the FCC is obligated to take
account of a public broadcaster's legal duties under Section 504 in
making its public interest determinations."6 The Supreme Court re-
versed this directive to the FCC, finding that it had no obligation to
enforce section 504. Rather, that obligation fell on the funding agency,
61. The author does not mean to suggest that the Supreme Court's decisions
under the Rehabilitation Act have been uniformly antithetical to the rights of individu-
als with disabilities. In Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287 (1985), the Court assumed
without deciding that section "504 reaches at least some conduct that has an unjustifi-
able disparate impact upon the handicapped." Nevertheless the Court held that Ten-
nessee's proposed reduction of the number of annual days of inpatient hospital care
covered by its state Medicaid program did not violate section 504. In School Board of
Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273 (1987), the Court found that persons afflicted
with contagious diseases are handicapped individuals within the meaning of section
504. Nevertheless, reviewing the Court's section 504 jurisprudence over a decade and a
half, one cannot help but be struck by its bleakness from the viewpoint of individuals
with disabilities.
62. 473 U.S. 234 (1985).
63. Id.
64. Civil Rights Remedies Equalization Act, Pub. L. No. 99-506, 100 Stat.
1845, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7 (1982).
65. 459 U.S. 498 (1983).
66. 655 F.2d 297, 307 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
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in this case the Department of Education. 7 Ironically, in a related case
brought by the same group of plaintiffs, another court of appeals re-
versed a district court which had ordered the Department of Education
to promulgate regulations directing its grantees (public television sta-
tions) to implement section 504 for hearing-impaired viewers. The Su-
preme Court denied certiorari in this litigation.68 Therefore, not only
had the Court denied plaintiffs the right to seek a remedy before the
licensing agency, but it also denied them the opportunity to argue in
the Court that the federal funding agency should be required to pro-
mulgate implementing regulations.
Similarly, in United States Department of Transportation v. Para-
lyzed Veterans of America,69 the Court addressed a decision of the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit which had held
that commercial airlines must comply with section 504.70 The circuit
court based its decision on the fact that the United States provides fi-
nancial assistance to airport operators through grants from a trust fund
created by the Airport and Airway Development Act of 1970 and also
operates a nationwide air traffic control system. Relying on its decision
in Grove City College v. Bell,71 the Supreme Court gave a narrow in-
terpretation to the meaning of being a federal grantee. The Court
found that despite the massive benefits which the federal government
provides to commercial airlines, they are not grantees and therefore not
covered by the Rehabilitation Act. 2 Congress effectively overturned
this decision with enactment of the Air Carrier Access Act of 1986.73
In yet another restrictive decision the Court addressed whether a
federal agency may treat alcoholism as "willful misconduct" for the
purpose of denying access to benefits. 74 Honorably discharged veterans
are entitled to receive educational assistance benefits under the "G.I.
Bill" to facilitate their readjustment to civilian life.7 5 Those benefits
67. 459 U.S. at 509. The Court did state that if a licensee was found "guilty" of
violating the Rehabilitation Act, or any other federal statute, the FCC "would cer-
tainly be obligated to consider the possible relevance of such a violation in determining
whether or not to renew the lawbreaker's license." Id. at 510.
68. Greater Los Angeles Council on Deafness v. Comm. Television of Southern
California, 719 F.2d 1017, 1021, 1022 (9th Cir. 1983) cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1252
(1984).
69. 477 U.S. 597 (1986).
70. Paralyzed Veterans of America v. CAB, 752 F.2d 694 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
71. 465 U.S. 555 (1984).
72. 477 U.S. at 611-12.
73. Pub. L. No. 99-435, 100 Stat. 1080, 49 U.S.C. App. § 1374(c) (1986). It
should also be noted that subsequently Congress more broadly overturned the Grove
City College case by enactment of the Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, Pub. L.
No. 100-259, 102 Stat. 28 (1988). The Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987 is applica-
ble to section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. 29 U.S.C. § 794(b).
74. Traynor v. Turnage, 485 U.S. 535 (1988).
75. 38 U.S.C. § 1651 et. seq.
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generally must be used within ten years of discharge or release from
the service. However, the statute allows the ten year period to be ex-
tended if a veteran is prevented from using the benefits by "a physical
or mental disability which was not a result of . . . [his] own willful
misconduct. 718 The Veterans' Administration (VA) construed this stat-
utory extension so as not to protect veterans who failed to use the G.I.
Bill because of "primary" alcoholism.77 Two veterans, recovered al-
coholics whose alcoholism prevented them from using their G.I. Bill
benefits within ten years, challenged the VA's interpretation as viola-
tive of section 504. Without deciding "whether alcoholism is a disease
whose course its victims cannot control," the Court ruled that the VA
could so discriminate against alcoholic veterans.7 8 Again, Congress felt
compelled to reverse the result. Within several months, it enacted the
Veterans' Benefits and Programs Improvement Act of 1988 specifically
providing that:
For the purpose of any provision relating to the extension of a delim-
iting period under any education benefit or rehabilitation program
administered by the Veterans' Administration, the disabling effects
of chronic alcoholism shall not be considered to be the result of will-
ful misconduct.
7 9
76. 485 U.S. at 538.
77. The footnote reads:
The applicable regulation, 38 C.F.R. § 3.301(c)(2) (1987) provide(d): Alco-
holism: The simple drinking of alcoholic beverage is not of itself willful mis-
conduct. The deliberate drinking of a known poisonous substance or under
conditions which would raise a presumption to that effect will be considered
willful misconduct. If, in the drinking of a beverage to enjoy its intoxicating
effects, intoxication results proximately [sic] and immediately in disability
or death, the disability or death will be considered the result of the person's
willful misconduct. Organic diseases and disabilities which are a secondary
result of the chronic use of alcohol as a beverage, whether out of compulsion
or otherwise, will not be considered of willful misconduct origin. This regu-
lation was intended by the Veterans' Administration to incorporate the prin-
ciples of a 1964 administrative decision. 37 Fed. Reg. 20335, 20336 (1972)
(proposed regulation); 37 Fed. Reg. 24662 (1972) (final regulation). The
1964 decision provided that alcoholism that is "secondary to and a manifes-
tation of an acquired psychiatric disorder" would not be characterized as
willful misconduct. Administrator's Decision, Veterans' Administration No.
988, Interpretation of the Term "Willful Misconduct" as Related to the
Residuals of Chronic Alcoholism, Aug. 13, 1964, App. 142-143. The Veter-
ans' Administration refers to this type of alcoholism as "secondary," and to
alcoholism unrelated to an underlying psychiatric disorder as "primary."
See, ibid.; Veterans' Administration Manual M21-1, change 149, subch. XI,
§ 50.32 (Dec. 23, 1979) (hereinafter VA Manual). Petitioners were found to
have suffered from primary alcoholism.
Id. at 538, n.2.
78. Id. at 552.
79. Pub. L. No. 100-689, 102 Stat. 4170, Section 109, 38 U.S.C. § 105(c).
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IV. A CONSTITUTIONAL DIsCURSION
As already noted, one of the major deficiencies with the Rehabili-
tation Act is that it only applies to the federal government, federal
grantees and federal contractors, in certain situations. Therefore, when
a Texas city denied a special use permit for the operation of a group
home for the mentally retarded pursuant to a municipal zoning ordi-
nance, the program that wanted to operate the group home had no
remedy under the Rehabilitation Act.80 Instead, the Cleburne Living
Center brought suit against the City of Cleburne alleging violation of
the Equal Protection Clause of the fourteenth amendment. When that
case reached the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, that court determined
that mental retardation is a "quasi-suspect classification." Therefore,
the court assessed the validity of the ordinance under "intermediate-
level scrutiny" and struck down the ordinance.81 The Supreme Court
granted certiorari.
8 2
In City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc.,83 on the ulti-
mate question of whether the zoning ordinance violated the equal pro-
tection rights of mentally retarded persons as applied to them, the Su-
preme Court upheld the Fifth Circuit.8 Significantly, however, in
reaching that decision, the Court rejected the Fifth Circuit's decision
that mentally retarded persons constitute a quasi-suspect classification.
The Court based this decision on a number of reasons. First, it found
that mentally retarded persons are a large and diversified group, and
therefore, how they are to be treated is a difficult and technical matter
that goes beyond "substantive judgments about legislative decisions." 8
Second, the Court reasoned that mentally retarded persons do not de-
serve the status of a quasi-suspect classification since they have been
the beneficiary of a number of state and federal laws addressing their
difficulties "in a matter that belies a continuing antipathy or prejudice
and a corresponding need for more intrusive oversight by the judici-
ary." 86 The Court next reasoned that "[t]he legislative response, which
80. Cleburne Living Center v. City of Cleburne, Texas, 726 F.2d 191 (5th Cir.
1984).
81. Id. at 198.
82. 469 U.S. 1016 (1984).
83. 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
84. Id. at 450.
85. Id. at 442-3. The author is not persuaded by this reasoning. Surely racial
minorities, who are considered to be suspect classifications, have various and disparate
problems and are not all cut from the same mold. Nevertheless, in a series of decisions
the Court has addressed discrimination on the basis of race using the most heightened
level of judicial scrutiny reserved for suspect classifications. See Loving v. Virginia, 388
U.S. 1 (1967); Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984).
86. 473 U.S. at 443. Again, this author is not persuaded. Surely the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 was primarily addressed to discrimination against black Americans. The
Voting Rights Act of 1965 and its later amendments addressed similar concerns. In
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could hardly have occurred and survived without public support, ne-
gates any claim that the mentally retarded are politically powerless in
the sense that they have no ability to attract the attention of the
lawmakers. 87 Finally, the Court opined that:
[I]f the large and amorphous class of the mentally retarded were
deemed quasi-suspect. . . it would be difficult to find a principled
way to distinguish a variety of other groups who have perhaps im-
mutable disabilities setting them off from others, who cannot them-
selves mandate the desired legislative responses, and who can claim
some degree of prejudice from at least part of the public at large.88
Thus, while the Court struck down this particular case of discrimina-
tion against this particular group of handicapped persons, it neverthe-
less managed to weaken future equal protection claims asserted by, not
only mentally retarded persons, but other individuals with disabilities.
V. THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT OF 1990 - A
CONSTITUTIONAL CONUNDRUM
Given the inherent deficiencies of the Rehabilitation Act, exacer-
bated by numerous restrictive interpretations by the Supreme Court, it
is not surprising that Congress chose to revisit this area and enact
broad remedial legislation, the Americans With Disabilities Act of
1990. Congress set forth in the A.D.A. a series of findings to justify the
legislation. Congress found that, "some 43,000,000 Americans have one
or more physical or mental disabilities, and this number is increasing as
the population as a whole is growing older. .."89 Congress found that
these individuals with disabilities have been subject to serious forms of
discrimination and "have often had no legal recourse to redress such
discrimination."9' 0 It found that they are "severely disadvantaged so-
cially, vocationally, economically and educationally."91 Significantly,
Congress then made the following finding:
addition, there have been a variety of minority set-aside and affirmative action pro-
grams. See, e.g., Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980); Metro Broadcasting, Inc.
v. Federal Communications Commission, - U.S. __ 110 S. Ct. 2997
(1990). Nevertheless, the Court properly continues to view discrimination on the basis
of race as suspect.
87. 473 U.S. at 445. Again, one only has to substitute the phrase "racial minori-
ties" for "the mentally retarded" to realize the shallowness of the majority's reasoning.
88. Id. This is a floodgates argument rather than reasoned decision making. The
Court feared deeming mentally retarded persons a quasi-suspect classification because
there might be other equally deserving groups which could, under the Court's previous
rationales, be justified in being treated similarly.
89. A.D.A., supra note 1, at Sec. 2(a)(1), 42 U.S.C.A. § 12101(a)(1) (West,
1991).
90. Id. at Sec. 2(a)(4), 42 U.S.C.A. § 12101(a)(4).
91. Id. at Sec. 2(a)(6), 42 U.S.C.A. § 12101(a)(6).
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individuals with disabilities are a discrete and insular minority who
have been faced with restrictions and limitations, subjected to a his-
tory of purposeful unequal treatment, and relegated to a position of
political powerlessness in our society, based on characteristics that
are beyond the control of such individuals and resulting from stereo-
typic assumptions not truly indicative of the individual ability of
such individuals to participate in, and contribute to, society.. .2
As a result, Congress invoked "the sweep of Congressional authority,
including the power to enforce the fourteenth amendment and to regu-
late commerce, in order to address the major areas of discrimination
faced day to day by people with disabilities."9 13
Much has been written about the Americans with Disabilities
Act9 4 and the regulatory process to implement the A.D.A. is under-
way,9 5 but not without criticism.96 This author will leave it to others to
address in detail the various provisions of the Act and how they are
being, or should be, enforced. There is, however, a constitutional issue
which bears some consideration. The issue underlies how the courts
should view future alleged acts of discrimination against persons with
disabilities by states or state actors, particularly where such acts are
not covered by the A.D.A. By what standard should the courts now
scrutinize allegations of discrimination against individuals on the basis
of disability asserted under the equal protection clause?
The legislative finding in the A.D.A. quoted above is a very close
paraphrase of perhaps the most famous footnote in American constitu-
tional law, footnote 4 in United States v. Carolene Products Com-
92. Id. at Sec. 2(a)(7), 42 U.S.C.A. § 12101(a)(7).
93. Id. at Sec. 2(b)(4), 42 U.S.C.A. § 12101(b)(4).
94. See, e.g., The Americans with Disabilities Act Symposium, a View from the
Inside. 64 TEMPLE L. REV. 371 (1991). See also THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES
ACT: A PRACTICAL AND LEGAL GUIDE TO IMPACT, ENFORCEMENT AND COMPLIANCE
(BNA 1990); Blandfield, Undue Hardship: Title I of the Americans With Disabilities
Act, 59 FORDHAM L. REV. 113 (1990); Feldblum, The Americans with Disabilities
Act Definition of Disability, 7 THE LABOR LAWYER 11 (1991); Gardner and
Campanella, The Undue Hardship Defense to the Reasonable Accomodation Require-
ment of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, id. at 37; Henderson, Addiction
as Disability: The Protection of Alcoholics and Drug Addicts Under the Americans
with Disabilities Act of 1990, 44 VAND. L. REV. 713 (1991); Mayerson, The Ameri-
cans with Disabilities Act-An Historic Overview, 7 THE LABOR LAWYER 1 (1991);
Morin, Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990: Social Integration Through Employ-
ment, 40 CATH. U. L. REV. 189 (1990); Weirich, Reasonable Accommodation Under
The Americans With Disabilities Act, 7 THE LABOR LAWYER 27 (1991).
95. 56 Fed. Reg. 35408-35756 (July 26, 1991).
96. "Rules on hiring disabled called paternalistic," (AP), The Sentinel, July 23,
1991, at A3; "Disability regs confuse employers," (AP), The Sentinel, July 27, 1991,
at B8; Disability Act Regs Draw Mixed Reactions, THE NAT'L. L. J. 10 (August 12,
1991); New Disabilities Act Regulations May Pose Problems for Industry, 14 THE
NAT'L. L. J. 17 (August 26, 1991).
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pany.9 In this footnote, the Court attempted to articulate in a coherent
fashion the basis for heightened judicial scrutiny in certain areas of
constitutional adjudication. The Court found:
There may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption of
constitutionality when legislation appears on its face to be within a
specific prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of the first ten
amendments, which are deemed equally specific when held to be em-
braced within the fourteenth...
Nor need we inquire whether similar considerations enter into the
review of statutes directed at particular religious. . . or national...
or racial minorities. . . whether prejudice against discrete and insu-
lar minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously to
curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be re-
lied upon to protect minorities, and which call for a correspondingly
more searching judicial inquiry .... 98
There can be little question that in adopting its finding in the A.D.A.,
Congress was attempting to utilize the Carolene Products formulation
to mandate a heightened level of judicial scrutiny in cases of discrimi-
nation on the basis of disability.
This presents the nice constitutional question: Can Congress by
statute create a quasi-suspect, or even a suspect, classification where
the Supreme Court has previously held that a sub-group of that classifi-
cation is not quasi-suspect? In other words, where the Supreme Court
has previously held that one sub-group of Americans with disabilities,
individuals with mental retardation, do not constitute even a quasi-sus-
pect class,9 9 can Congress statutorily mandate that not only individuals
with mental retardation, but all other individuals with disabilities, be
treated as a quasi-suspect or suspect class?
This is a question that will be debated by lawyers and scholars,
but ultimately decided by the courts. A few preliminary thoughts are
offered here. In addressing this question, it is necessary to consider
what has been denominated the "Ratchet Theory" 100 of equal protec-
tion analysis. Perhaps the best articulation of that theory can be found
in Katzenbach v. Morgan.101 The background of Morgan is that some
years earlier the Supreme Court unanimously rejected a black citizen's
attack on North Carolina's literacy test as a qualification for voting in
Lassiter v. Northhampton County Board of Elections.1 0 2 Subsequently,
Congress enacted the Voting Rights Act of 1965 which suspended liter-
97. 304 U.S. 144, 152-3 (1938).
98. Id. (citations omitted).
99. See notes 85-88, supra, and accompanying text.
100. See Cohen, Congressional Power to Interpret Due Process and Equal Pro-
tection, 27 STAN. L. REV. 606, 612 (1975).
101. 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
102. 360 U.S. 45 (1959).
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acy tests in covered localities.103 Certain registered voters in New York
City had brought suit to challenge the constitutionality of one of the
provisions of the Voting Rights Act insofar as it prohibited the enforce-
ment of the election laws of New York requiring an ability to read and
write English as a condition of voting. In Morgan, the Court noted its
prior decision in Lassiter, but found that it was not dispositive. Rather,
the Court articulated the question before it as follows:
Without regard to whether the judiciary would find that the Equal
Protection Clause itself nullifies New York's English literacy re-
quirement as so applied, could Congress prohibit the enforcement of
the state law by legislating under § 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment? 1"
The Court held that Congress does have such power. The Court
found that Congress may, under section 5 of the fourteenth amend-
ment, enact laws to increase equal protection guarantees, although
Congress may not "restrict, abrogate, or dilute these guarantees." 10 5
The Court's rationale, that Congress can turn the equal protection
ratchet only one way,108 to increase equal protection rights, has been
approved in subsequent opinions into the 19801s.107.
While the "Ratchet Theory" appears to remain good constitu-
tional law, it has never been used by the Supreme Court to authorize
Congress to create by statute a quasi-suspect or suspect classification.
However, such authority would appear to be inherent in the Ratchet
Theory. Whether or not the Supreme Court ultimately decides that
Congress has now mandated heightened judicial scrutiny in cases of
discrimination on the basis of disability brought under the fourteenth
amendment, there can be no question that the A.D.A. will provide,
when fully effective, powerful avenues of redress for Americans with
disabilities who are-subjected to discrimination.
103. Section 4(e) of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 79 Stat. 439, 42 U.S.C. §
1973(b) (1964 ed., Supp. I).
104. 384 U.S. at 649.
105. Id. at 651 n.10.
106. THE WEBSTER'S NEW UNIVERSAL UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY, DELUXE SEC-
OND EDITION 1495 (1983) defines a ratchet as: "1. a hinged catch, or pawl, arranged
so as to engage with a toothed wheel or bar whose teeth slope in one direction, thus
imparting forward movement and preventing backward movement."
107. See Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 732 (1982);
Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 118, 248 (1970).
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